The Problem According to Holdsworth

Holdsworth's argument emerges as a defense against the "problem of evil," which he claims is raised against Christians who believe in a loving God, suggesting that such a God could not exist in light of evil's presence.

He asserts that atheists lack the ability to denounce evil due to their belief that only the physical universe exists, devoid of any transcendent reality. To explain the horrors associated with evil, he argues that atheists must rely solely on material causes. He even attempts a convoluted evolutionary explanation for the emergence of evil.

Holdsworth references a heinous murder that occurred in his locality to emotionally bolster his argument. However, this particular case, upon investigation, seems to stem from a psychotic episode likely triggered by drug use, which suggests tangible causes within the brain. Thus, framing the discussion around an event that has clear physical explanations is a weak foundation and tends to obfuscate the real issue.

Nonetheless, the situation itself does evoke a sense of horror that many would readily label as "evil," raising questions about the adequacy of reductionist explanations and the essence of evil itself, as well as what an atheist can meaningfully say about it.

Atheism is not Materialism

A key issue here, as Cain highlights, is that atheism encompasses a wide range of beliefs. Holdsworth's argument seems to hinge on a notion of reductive materialism, which posits that everything can be distilled to lower-level interactions, stripping our experience of reality of its richness, including concepts like free will and causation.

However, this view does not encompass the entirety of atheism. While many atheists identify with materialism, there are those who reject it. For instance, concepts such as systems biology challenge strictly reductionist perspectives, suggesting that reductionism is more of a philosophical stance than a scientific conclusion. Biologist Denis Noble argues that understanding biological systems requires more than just molecular interactions, and physicist George Ellis contends that a bottom-up view of causation is inadequate, supported by examples from various fields.

Holdsworth's critiques target a flawed philosophy but mistakenly equate it with atheism as a whole. Just because many atheists are materialists does not mean that all must adhere to this viewpoint. Atheists might subscribe to alternative philosophies like strong emergence, panpsychism, or even hold views on morality that do not hinge on the existence of God.

Conversely, Cain identifies as a naturalist, which aligns more closely with a robust form of atheism. Naturalists may reject reductionist views but still believe that "evil" must have natural explanations rather than moral ones that transcend nature. While Holdsworth may conflate naturalism with materialism, Cain argues for a more nuanced distinction.

Reductionism and Emergence

Cain suggests that reductionism is not a necessary framework due to the existence of secondary forms, asserting that entities made from atoms can hold as much significance as the atoms themselves. He uses the analogy of LEGO bricks to illustrate this point, proposing that we can distinguish between primary and secondary realities.

However, this argument becomes muddled by two intertwined concepts: the systems argument, which posits that higher-order processes can exert downward causation, and the forms argument, which suggests that perceived entities possess their own reality. Cain provocatively questions if constructs like LEGO cities exist separately from their individual pieces.

He then makes a leap from this discussion to the realms of mind and morality, asserting that morality arises from our instincts for self-preservation and social cooperation, highlighting that pure selfishness is often counterproductive.

However, this oversimplification inadvertently reinforces Holdsworth's assertion. If moral concepts are merely reducible products of evolutionary processes, they risk losing their significance. One could argue that feelings of good and evil do not represent objective truths but rather subjective experiences, which is the crux of Holdsworth's argument.

Nevertheless, let's entertain the notion that moral feelings could be seen as emergent principles stemming from conscious minds. Yet, we face significant challenges in understanding how various aspects of reality, such as quantum physics and historical events, interrelate.

What remains unaddressed is the role of consciousness in shaping our understanding of reality. Cain posits that consciousness infers the existence of entities, as articulated by physicist Max Planck, who asserted that consciousness is fundamental to our understanding of existence.

Evil or Wildness?

Given this understanding, we must question the implications of positing an underlying "wildness" versus a transcendent moral framework. While wildness offers no insight into the essence of reality, values suggest that consciousness must have its roots in a deeper reality. A planet, for instance, is no more real than concepts like beauty or goodness if we accept consciousness as the lens through which we comprehend existence.

The inquiry then turns to the naturalist's claim regarding what is considered "natural." Is it an endeavor to grasp reality beyond human perception, or does it accept everything as given? The former aligns with scientific inquiry, while the latter resembles a primitive theological stance.

Returning to Holdsworth's original argument, Cain's distinction between primary and secondary realities seems somewhat irrelevant. He views evil as a set of behavioral heuristics shaped by evolutionary forces, while Holdsworth and I argue that evil participates in a transcendent realm of values. Cain's position may interweave basic science with philosophical musings, but Holdsworth's claim— that evil, as he perceives it, cannot exist for an atheist—merely states the obvious. An atheist, by definition, does not subscribe to Holdsworth's understanding of evil.

Goodness, Greenness

To reiterate, Cain perceives the murder mentioned by Holdsworth as "evil" due to our emotional and rational assessments of behavior influenced by evolution, deeming such acts deviations from acceptable norms. Holdsworth challenges this reasoning, questioning how Cain can uphold the concept of evil in a reality governed solely by atoms. Yet, Holdsworth's argument misses the mark.

More fundamentally, evil is not merely a matter of causation or emergence; it reflects a quality. Goodness and evil are values akin to other qualities, such as blueness or kindness. The essence of greenness, for instance, exists in the mind, separate from any underlying causation, unlike physical processes that produce observable phenomena.

Philosopher Plato might argue that values exist in an ideal realm, while a religious perspective might posit that morality and aesthetics represent realities we engage with, making works like Dante's "Divine Comedy" as valid as scientific formulas.

In this view, while science elucidates the behaviors and properties of reality up to a point, morality and aesthetics illuminate the nature of reality itself. Cain asserts that we progress from cognitive science to sociology, political science, and philosophical ethics, though he frames this as a hierarchical ascent. A religious perspective would extend this inquiry to theology and the deeply personal experiences pursued by mystics, offering a unity between subject and object absent in the objective reality mapped by contemporary sciences.

Ultimately, this discussion diverges from the initial arguments. Cain argues that the average theist relies on caricatures of their adversaries, just as they favor mythic narratives over realistic models. In targeting a moderately influential YouTuber with flawed arguments, he risks falling into the same trap of oversimplification that characterizes Holdsworth's reasoning. Thus, the debate remains entangled in a field of misrepresented perspectives. Now, I think it's time for a cup of tea—or perhaps just a collection of higher entropy atoms.